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INTRODUCTION

In Octane Fitness v. Icon Health,1 the Supreme Court
overturned a highly restrictive rule adopted by the Federal Circuit
governing the award of attorney's fees in patent infringement
litigation. To justify an award of attorney's fees, the Federal Circuit
had required a finding of (1) an objectively baseless lawsuit (2)
brought in bad faith.2 The new standard established in Octane gives
discretion to courts to award attorney's fees in cases that seem
3
exceptional based on the facts or the law.
The question immediately generated by Octane was whether
the move toward greater discretion over fee awards would be extended
.

William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University;
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, knhylton@bu.edu. I thank
participants in the University of Texas School of Law Patent Damages conference,
June 9-10, 2016, for helpful suggestions and comments. I thank Philip Chen and
Qiuyi Wu for research assistance.
1. 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
2. Id. at 1752 (citing Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393
F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
3. Id. at 1755-56.
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to the matter of enhanced damages for patent infringement. Section
284 of the Patent Act permits courts to increase damages up to three
times the patentee's loss. 4 As in the case of attorney's fees, the Federal
Circuit had adopted a highly restrictive standard for enhanced
damages.5 Octane encouraged litigants to challenge the Federal
Circuit's interpretation of the enhancement provision of Section 284.
Two patentees, Halo Electronics and Stryker Corporation, responded
to the encouragement by filing certiorari petitions in the Supreme
Court seeking to overturn the Federal Circuit's standard on enhanced
damages and put in its place a standard providing greater discretion to
courts on the matter.6 The Supreme Court responded on June 13, 2016,
in Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics,7 siding with the patentees.
The new standard established in Halo grants courts the discretion to
two
enhance damages within guidelines suggested by "nearly
8
centuries of application and interpretation of the Patent Act."
This paper takes a normative approach to patent infringement
damages. Its underlying premise is that the goal of a damages regime
should be to maximize society's welfare. Patent damages should
therefore balance society's interest in encouraging innovation against
the need to regulate infringement incentives. This balancing approach
generates an optimal standard for awarding enhanced damages and
guidelines for determining the size of the damages multiplier. On the
legal standard, the approach developed here illuminates the factors
that should be taken into consideration in the enhancement analysis,
and, more importantly, the reasons those factors should be considered.
On the precise size of the multiplier, this approach suggests principles
that both justify and constrain the multiplier: (1) the elimination of
gains from willful infringement, (2) the multiplication of damages for
covert infringement, and (3) the social interest in enhancing damages
where the ratio of the social to the private benefit from the patent is
high.
Although the analysis here is mostly normative and draws
heavily on the economic theory of penalties, 9 the aim of this paper is
4. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2011).
5. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
6. Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted,
136 S. Ct. 356 (2015); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015).
7. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935-36 (2016).
8. Id. at 1935.
9.

See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach,

76 J. POLIT. ECON. 169 (1968) (setting out a normative economic theory of
punishment); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85
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to provide a set of practical guidelines courts can follow in explaining,
justifying, and developing rules to structure the discretion that Halo
has returned to them. Halo provides an opportunity for courts to
integrate deterrence policy more closely with the rules governing the
enhancement of damages for patent infringement.

II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

On the question of enhanced damages, the relevant portion of
the Patent Act, Section 284, is rather sparse. It says that "[w]hen
damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either
event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed." 10
A quick glance at these words should leave a reader with the
impression that they were intended to grant courts discretion over
enhanced damages, up to the limit of trebling. In spite of the seemingly
high degree of discretion granted by Section 284, the Federal Circuit
erected a set of significant restrictions on the discretion of courts to
enhance damages in Seagate, which required a threshold finding of an
objectively high likelihood of infringement coupled with subjective
bad faith.'1 A finding of subjective bad faith would be appropriate only
where the defendant either knew or should have known of the high
COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985) (setting out a positive economic theory of criminal
law); Keith N. Hylton, Theory of Penalties and the Economics of CriminalLaw, 1

REv. L. & EcoN. 175 (2005) (offering a formal version of Posner's argument that
also reconciles the accounts in Becker and Posner); Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin,
Innovation and Optimal Punishment, with AntitrustApplications, 10 COMP. LAW &

ECON. 1 (2014) (examining relationship between punishment and innovation
incentives).
10. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2011).
11. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated
by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). Only after such a
finding may a court consider the traditional "totality of the circumstances" factors
used to determine whether enhancement was appropriate. The Federal Circuit's
standard appears to focus on the probability of infringement, viewed both
objectively and subjectively. See, e.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore
& Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Powell v. Home Depot
U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The requirement of an
objectively high likelihood implies that the facts and law should, to a reasonable

person, point to a conclusion that it was far more likely than not that infringement
occurred. The additional requirement of subjectively bad faith implies that the facts
must indicate that it was far more likely than not that the infringing party knew that
he was infringing the patent-that his own subjective prediction of the likelihood of
infringement was nearly the same as the objective probability.

420
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likelihood of infringement. 12 Only after establishing the objective and
subjective components required by Seagate could a court consider the
traditional "totality of the circumstances" factors used to determine the
degree of enhancement. 13 In addition, the Federal Circuit had adopted
a de novo standard of review for the objective portion of the Seagate
test. 14
The Supreme Court held in Halo that the Federal Circuit's
approach reflected an erroneous interpretation of Section 284.15 The
new standard set forth in Halo discards the threshold test focusing on
the probability of infringement and replaces it with a flexible standard
that takes into account other variables. 16
This paper is not an effort to reexamine the statutory
interpretation question, at least not directly. It focuses on the
normative questions of the appropriate standard for enhanced damages
and the appropriate range for enhanced damages.

III.

NORMATIVE QUESTION

How should patent damages be determined? What goals
should a damages award for patent infringement seek to secure? In
trying to answer these questions I will start by ignoring the distinction
between compensatory and punitive damages and consider the
question of optimal damages generally. An optimal damages award
17
may be greater or less than the compensatory level.
The question of optimal damages has been examined in
greatest depth in the torts context. 18 Analyses of optimal damages have
12. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
13. Read Corp. v Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[T]he
paramount determination in deciding to grant enhancement... is the egregiousness
of the defendant's conduct based on all the facts and circumstances.").
14. Bard, 682 F.3d at 1005.
15. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933-34 (2016) (rejecting the Seagate test because
Section 284 does not require any rigid formula to warrant enhanced damages).
16. Id. ("As with any exercise of discretion, courts should continue to take into
account the particular circumstances of each case in deciding whether to award
damages, and in what amount. Section 284 permits district courts to exercise their
discretion in a manner free from the inelastic constraints of the Seagate test.").
17. Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties,
87 GEO. L.J. 421, 424-39 (1998).
18. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1115-24 (1972) (discussing the economically efficient strategy in the context
of pollution control); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
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been prominent in the modem law and economics literature, but the
question of optimal damages has been examined less directly in
19

writings as far back as Bentham.
A.

Damages Theory

The optimal damages literature has distinguished two general

types of damages awards. One is loss-internalizingdamages; the other
is gain-eliminatingdamages.2 1 In this part, I will review these theories
of damages and suggest applications to patent infiingement litigation.
The torts literature on which I rely typically examines damages awards
in the context of a lawsuit between a victim and an "injurer." 2' In this

article, I will refer to a lawsuit between a victim and an infringer. Also,
I use the term infringement in its most general sense to refer to any
infringement of a legal right-whether an ordinary tort or a case of
patent infringement. In spite of this general defmition, I will use
examples mostly from patent infringement to illustrate the arguments.

1.

Loss Internalization

Under the loss internalization approach, the damages award
should seek to internalize to the infringing party the total social loss
generated by the infringement.22 Thus, if the infringement has injured

more than one person, and if there will be only one damages award
issued for the infringement, the damages award should force the

infringer to pay a sum that internalizes the losses of all of the victims.

STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 58-62 (1987) (conducting a detailed analysis on what
levels of due care should be required in order to minimize the social costs of

accidents); David D. Haddock, Fred S. McChesney & Menahem Spiegel, An
OrdinaryEconomic Rationalefor ExtraordinaryLegal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1, 8 (1990) (discussing the standard model of tort remedies); Hylton, supra note 17;
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:An Economic Analysis,
111 HARv. L. REV. 869, 878-96 (1998) (noting that the proper magnitude of
damages is equal to the harm the defendant has caused to avoid socially undesirable
consequences).
19. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION (H. Frowde ed., Clarendon Press 1907) (1781).
20. Hylton, Punitive Damages, supra note 17, at 421.
21.

E.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5 (2007).

22. Id.; Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113
YALE L.J. 347, 365 (2003) ("The goal is to force tortfeasors, and others similarly
situated, to internalize the harms to society caused by their conduct."); See Polinsky
& Shavell, supra note 18, at 878.
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Internalization implies that the infringer will anticipate ex ante
incurring the entire loss to society as if it were his own.
The simplest case representing the internalization function of
damages is that of a single infringer and single victim. To keep matters
simple at the outset, I assume that the loss suffered by the single victim
constitutes the entire social loss associated with the infringement of
that victim's right. The infringer must decide whether to take care to
avoid the infringement. Taking care is costly. Intentional injuries are
simply a special case of this model where the cost of taking care
represents the forgone gain from the intentionally injurious act. Thus,
if the infringer does not anticipate having to pay damages to the victim,
he will not take care. Moreover, optimal internalization would
encourage the infringer to take care whenever it is socially desirable
for him to do so. 2 3 Under the standard economic approach, care is
socially desirable whenever the ex ante total costs to society are
smaller
when the infringer takes care than when he does not take
24
care.
Consider a simple example. Suppose the cost of taking care
(for the infringer) to avoid infringement is $20. If the infringer takes
care, the probability of infringement occurring will be .25. If the
infringer does not take care, the probability of infringement occurring
will be .75. In addition, let the harm from infringement be $100.
Taking care is socially desirable under these assumptions because the
cost of care is less than the incremental social harm from failing to do
so: $20 < (.75 -. 25)($100). On the other hand, suppose the cost of
taking care is $60 instead of $20. In this case, since $60 > $50, it is not
socially desirable for the infringer to take care.
A damages award set at full compensation will induce the
infringer to take care ex ante whenever it is socially desirable for him
to do so. Thus, if the damages award is set equal to the victim's loss,
an infringer for whom the cost of taking care is $20 (low-cost
infringer) will take care, while an infringer for whom the cost of taking
23. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 18, at 879 ("If damages equal harm,
potential injurers will in theory have socially correct incentives to take precautions.
Specifically, they will be induced to spend money on precautions if the expenditure
is socially worthwhile in the sense that the expenditure reduces the harm by a greater
amount.").
24. See Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1501, 1503 (2006) ("If the cost of taking care is less than the
expected injury costs that could be avoided by taking care, the actor should be
encouraged to take care in order to reduce overall social costs."); see also Richard
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 29, 33 (1972) (stating that society
is better off when the benefits in accident avoidance exceed the costs of prevention).
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care is $60 (high-cost infringer) will not take care. A full
compensation damages award in this case fully internalizes society's
losses to the infringer, and therefore generates socially desirable care
on the part of the infringer.
Now consider a case in which there is more than one victim.
Whenever the infringer causes harm, he imposes a loss of $100 each
on two victims. To bring the example within the realm of patent law,
suppose one victim is the patentee and the other victim is a licensee or
retailer of the patentee's product.25 Now it would be desirable for the
low-cost infringer to take care (since $20 < $100 = (.75 - .25)($200))

and also for the high-cost infringer to take care (since $60 < $100). If
only the patentee can sue for infringement, then the damages award of
$100 would be insufficient to generate socially optimal care. The
optimal damages award for this scenario would require an
enhancement of the damages award by a multiplier of two.
Next, consider a case of covert or concealed infringement.
While many instances of infringement are open and obvious, some
instances may be difficult to discover. For example, the infringing
technology may be buried deep within a complicated product, such as
an automobile, and therefore likely to be discovered only through luck
or a careful search.2 6 Suppose that when the infringer injures the
25. Indep. Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U.S. 459, 466
(1926) ("It is urged on behalf of the respondent that in equity the real party in
interest, the exclusive licensee whose contract rights are being trespassed upon by

the infringer, should be able without the presence of the owner of the patent to obtain
an injunction and damages directly against the infringer. We recognize that there is
a tendency in courts of equity to enjoin the violation of contract rights which are

invaded by strangers in a direct action by the party injured, instead of compelling a
roundabout resort to a remedy through the covenant, express or implied, of the other
contracting party. But such a short cut, however desirable, is not possible in a case
like this."); Mosaid Tech., Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., No. 6:1 1-cv-173,
2013 WL 1819769 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2013) (dismissing a patent infringement

claim brought by an exclusive licensee for lack of standing); Aspex Eyewear, Inc.
v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc.
v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
26. See Intamin Ltd. v. Magnetar Techs., Corp., 483 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir.

2007) (patented magnetic braking system for amusement park rides could not be
ascertained by a simple visual inspection); Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos.,
Inc., 275 F.3d 1066, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (patentee purchased and dissected a golf
club head to discover potential infringement of patent directed to an improved
perimeter weighting structure for metal golf club heads); Judin v. U.S., 110 F.3d
780, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (difficult to determine whether accused optical

communications device infringed patent without reverse-engineering the accused
device); Ashraf Zahr, Levels of "ReasonableInquiry" In Electronics Patent Cases,
LAw360 (June 5, 2014, 10:20 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/536202/levels-
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patentee, the patentee will discover the identity of the infringer, or
indeed the infringement itself, with a probability of only 20%. Again
it is socially desirable for the low-cost infringer-that is, the infringer
whose cost of taking is only $20-to take care. But the low-cost
infringer will not take care in this case because $20 >
(.75-.25)(.2)($100) = $10. Thus, if a court awards full compensation
damages in a setting where some infringers may escape identification,
infringers will fail to take socially desirable care.27 To fully internalize
ex ante the loss caused by the infringer, the court will have to enhance
damages by multiplying the compensatory award by a factor of 5.
Summing up the foregoing, in the standard case in which there
is only a single infringement victim and the identity of the infringer is
easy to determine, full compensation awards are sufficient to
internalize the social losses resulting from infringement. However,
when there are multiple victims or when the identity of the infringer
is difficult to determine, the full compensation award is insufficient to
internalize ex ante the social loss from infringement, and as a result
generates less than socially desirable care on the part of infringers. In
these instances, compensatory damages should be multiplied to
approach the optimal level of deterrence.
The examples considered so far involve measurable losses
suffered by identifiable victims. But these assumed circumstances
may not describe every real-world case of infringement. Suppose, for
example, that the infringement imposes some losses that are difficult
to measure.2 8 Many commentators have noted that lost profits from
patent infringement are often difficult to determine.2 9 Alternatively,
suppose the victim has suffered measurable losses that are disallowed
of-reasonable-inquiry-in-electronics-patent-cases (finding that the some electronic
devices may contain infringing software that cannot be analyzed because the source
code is unavailable; some may contain indiscernible components due to their size).
27. For the general argument covering torts, see Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REV. 869, 888
(1998). Cf Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Suppose a person
who goes around assaulting other people is caught only half the time. Then in
comparing costs ... of the assaults with the benefits to him, he will discount the
costs.., by 50 percent, and so in deciding whether to commit the next assault he
will not be confronted by the full social cost of his activity.").
28. E.g., Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 34 (Posner, J. noting, in the general torts context,
that some emotional injuries may be exceedingly difficult to measure).
29. Robert S. Frank & Denise W. DeFranco, PatentInfringementDamages: A
Brief Summary, 10 FED. CIRcurr B.J. 281, 281-89 (2000) (an award of lost profits
requires proof of but-for causation; the patentee who cannot prove causation is
entitled to a reasonable royalty award but determining such a royalty is often
difficult).
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by the legal system. For example, in the patent infringement context,
patentees generally cannot recover foreign lost profits in the U.S.3 ° Yet
another example would consist of losses imposed on specific victims
who cannot be identified or determined-consider, for example, the
problem of orphaned works in copyright law.3 1 To induce socially
optimal care on the part of the infringer, these types of losses should
be internalized ex ante to the infringer. But they cannot be internalized
by a compensatory damages award because they are neither
measurable nor legally compensable. The only substitute to precise
measurement of losses that could potentially induce optimal care
would be the employment of a multiplier for the inadequate damages
award.
I have considered losses suffered directly by victims.
However, there are other losses that result from infringement. The
most important "other" loss is the sapping of the incentive to innovate
that occurs as a result of infringement. If potential patentees discover
that their patents can be infringed without full compensation, they will
have a diminished incentive to innovate. That diminishment in the
incentive to innovate causes a loss in society's welfare, by inducing a
reduction in the rate of entry of new products or technological
processes to the market. To induce optimal care by the infringer, this
loss should be internalized.
To better organize the conceptual categories of harm, I will
follow Bentham by distinguishing categories of primary and
secondary losses.3 2 Primary losses are losses suffered directly by
30. For example, foreign lost profits due to patent infringement generally are
not recoverable in the U.S. See Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor
Int'l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that patentees are not
entitled to compensatory damages for lost foreign sales that are the allegedly
foreseeable result of the domestic infringement of patents); Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007) ("The presumption that United States
law governs domestically but does not rule the world applies with particular force in
patent law. The traditional understanding that our patent law operates only
domestically and does not extend to foreign activities is embedded in the Patent Act
itself, which provides that a patent confers exclusive rights in an invention within
the United States.") (internal quotations omitted); WestemGeco LLC v. ION
Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (damages cannot be

awarded for lost profits resulting from lost contracts for services to be performed
abroad).
31. An orphaned work is a work with a valid copyright but whose owners
cannot be determined. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 92
(2d Cir. 2014) (noting that the copyright holder of "orphan work" cannot be readily
identified or located).
32. BENTHAM, supra note 19, at 152 ("[M]ischief may be frequently
distinguished, as it were, into two shares or parcels: the one containing what may be

426
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identifiable victims. 33 Secondary losses are losses suffered by society
generally, or by unidentifiable victims. 34 Consider, as an analogous
case, crime. Crime victims suffer directly from each instance of crime.
However, society in general suffers too, as potential victims change
their behavior in anticipation of the possibility of crime. This second
set of losses, resulting from changes in behavior, fall in the category
of secondary harms.
2.

Gain Elimination

The second general category of damages consists of awards
that seek to eliminate the infringer's gain.35 For this type of award, the
goal is not to internalize ex ante the social loss from the infringer's
conduct, but to eliminate ex ante the prospect of gain to the infringing
party. Under this approach to damages, the only data of relevance to
the court would be information bearing on the infringer's gain.3 6 The
purpose of such an award would be to completely deter the infringer
by eliminating any gain from the activity of infringement.
The reason gain elimination may be necessary is that loss
internalization does not necessarily deter all instances of infringement.
Loss internalization deters only those instances of infringement where
the gain from infringement (or the cost of avoiding infringement) is
less than the incremental social loss resulting from the infringement.
To return to the example considered earlier of one victim and one
infringer, internalizing the loss would deter infringement by the lowcost infringer but would not deter infringement by a sufficiently highcost infringer. The gain elimination approach would deter
infringement by all infringers, whether the gain from infringement
(cost of avoiding infringement) is high or low. The gain-eliminating
award would have the same effect on incentives as an injunction.
Why might it be desirable to deter infringement by all potential
infringers no matter how high the gain from infringement? There are
two reasons presented in the literature on optimal damages. One is that
if the transaction cost of securing consent to an otherwise infringing
act is low, then potential infringers should be encouraged by the law
called the primary mischief; the other, what may be called the secondary."); Hylton,
supra note 17, at 435-39.
33. BENTHAM, supra note 19, at 152.
34. Id.
35. Hylton, Punitive Damages,supra note 17, at 421.
36. See Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Wealth and Punitive Damages, 17
WIDENER L. J. 927 (2008).
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to seek consent.3 7 Applying this general prescription to the patent
context, if the transaction cost of obtaining a license from the patentee
is low, the potential infringer should obtain a license. 38 The transaction
cost of securing a license would be low in a setting where the boundary
of the patent is clear and the burden of negotiating a license small.39
In this setting, a gain-eliminating award would induce infringers to
seek a license instead of infringing. Since transaction costs are low,
society would prefer all infringers to seek a license rather than incur
litigation and other costs associated with non-compensable losses
from infringement.
Under the gain elimination approach, there may still be a need
to multiply the award based on the defendant's gain.4" If the likelihood
that the infringer will be identified is less than one, then it may be
necessary to multiply damages to restore the gain-eliminating threat
from the damages award. For example, if the likelihood of the
infringer being identified is only 20%, then the infringer's gain would
have to be multiplied by a factor of 5 to generate an award that would
eliminate the infringer's ex ante expectation of gain.
The other justification provided in the literature for the gaineliminating award is to prevent infringements where the gain to the
infringer is very likely to always be less than the incremental harm to
society. 41 Of course, in this special case, compensatory awards that
fully incorporate the social loss would also work just as well to deter
infringement. But the gain-eliminating award might still be preferable
here given the risk that the compensatory award may not fully
37. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18; Hylton, Punitive Damages, supra
note 17, at 1109 ("[The] costs of imposing a penalty sufficient to eliminate the
offender's gain are minimal, because if the offender's gain exceeds the victim's loss,
the offender can arrange a consensual transaction.").
38. Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for PatentInfringement:A Transactions
Cost Approach, 45 Hous. L. REv., 1165, 1200 (2008).
39. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The PatentLitigation Explosion,
45 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 401, 403 (2013) ("Patents differ from real property where the
boundaries of a plot of land and the validity of a title usually can be verified at little
cost and with little uncertainty. In contrast, the validity of a patent may be challenged
and firms often have difficulty determining whether a technology infringes the
boundaries of a patent's claims.").
40. See Hylton, Punitive Damages, supra note 17, at 452; see also TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459-62 (1993) (holding that a punitive
damages award that is over 526 times as large as the compensatory damages award
is not "grossly excessive" after consideration of the relevant factors, including the
defendant's bad faith, reprehensible conduct, and potential financial gains).
41. See Hylton, Punitive Damages, supra note 17, at 460-64; Brief of Keith N.
Hylton as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 15-16, State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (No. 01-1289).
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incorporate the social loss-for example, not all victims may be able
to identify the infringer, or bring an action for damages, or prove their
damages. It is not clear that this scenario has a broad application to
patent law, given that infringement generally benefits society to some
degree by increasing use or consumption of the patented technology.
Still, there may be special cases where this special theory of gain
elimination may be applicable. For example, in a setting where perfect
price discrimination generated socially efficient consumption of the
patented technology, an act of infringement should be treated as purely
wasteful of social resources, and therefore should be subjected to a
penalty designed to eliminate the expectation of gain to the infringer.
3.

Extending Damages Theory to Intellectual
Property

Up to this point, I have applied the basic theory of damages
using the same formal structure used in the torts literature. However,
intellectual property arguably presents new issues that might require a
different treatment of the theory than observed in the torts context.
The most important difference is the innovation concern that I
described earlier within the category of secondary costs. In theory,
secondary costs may be observed in almost any setting where victims
are injured-because the risk of incurring an injury that will not be
compensated in full may affect the behavior of potential victims.
Given this, one could argue that damages awards should always be
enhanced to take secondary costs into account.
Intellectual property appears to be distinguishable from
general torts, however, because of the importance of costly investment
in innovation. For investments that are induced by the promise of
intellectual property protection, the loss of such protection would alter
investment behavior significantly. This is different from the torts
setting because few potential victims in the torts context make
investments conditional on the guarantee of compensation from the
tort system. For example, expenditure on health care can be viewed as
a common type of investment. Few people, however, would change
their decisions about seeking medical care if told that the tort system
might not compensate them for a specific tortious injury that might
occur in the future.
The presence of substantial and concentrated secondary
costs-i.e., costs of numerous and unidentifiable victims-provides a
special justification, in addition to the justifications from the torts
literature canvassed earlier, for enhancing damages in the intellectual
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property setting. As is true of all cases of secondary costs, the precise
level would be difficult to estimate.42 However, a general policy of
doubling or trebling damages might be preferable to simply awarding
full compensation damages.
The secondary costs category should be expanded further to
include social benefits (the negative of costs) from infringing activity.
Although infringement is often looked upon as bad conduct within
intellectual property law circles, it provides a benefit to society. The
infringer enhances society's welfare by providing a cheaper version of
a patented good to society. This is no different in general than a rival
entering and offering a substitute product at a much lower price than
an incumbent monopolist. In the general case of rival entry, we
encourage the entry and applaud its effects on consumer welfare.
The social gain from infringement is therefore a benefit from
the infringing activity which can be set against the loss to innovation
incentives. If the gain from infringement were always greater than the
losses from destroying innovation incentives, then there would be no
case for enhancement of damages-indeed, damage awards should
then be reduced below full compensation.
B.

Determinantsof Optimal Damages

So far I have presented the general case for enhancing damages
based on the internalization principle and on the complete deterrence
principle. I have not considered the form that an optimal damages
multiplier should take. This is a different concern from justifying
enhancement because the specific form of or algorithm for
determining an optimal award in the patent infringement context will
depend on the need to balance incentives for innovation with
incentives for infringement.
The first consideration that should go into an assessment of the
optimal damages award is the social value of the patented innovation.
This is an important factor distinguishing the damages assessment in
intellectual property from the ordinary torts setting. In the ordinary
torts setting, the social loss from failing to protect an individual from
harm is generally captured by the loss to the individual. If a driver
negligently kills someone who contributes $1 million each year to
support a family, the net present value of that stream of income support
is taken as a measure of the loss to society resulting from the driver's
negligence.
42. Hylton, Punitive Damages, supra note 17, at 439 ("In many instances, we
can neither observe offender gains nor accurately estimate social losses.").
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In the intellectual property context, however, the value of the
patent that has been infringed is not a measure of the social value of
the patent. The social value of the patent is the sum of the expected
social welfare surplus generated by the patent less the costs of
litigation and of the precautions taken to avoid infringement. The
expected welfare surplus is the sum of the expected welfare surplus
over the scenarios where infringement occurs and where it does not
occur. If infringement reduces the incentive to innovate, it reduces
social welfare by the extent of the patent's social value, not by the
extent of the patent's private value. Further, it is possible that the
patent's social value exceeds its private value; moreover, it is also
possible that the patent's private value is positive while its social value
is negative.
In deciding how generous a damages award should be, a
tradeoff must be considered. On one side, increasing damages reduces
the rate of infringement and therefore increases the static or
"deadweight" loss from intellectual property protection. On the other
side, increasing damages spurs investment in innovation, both by
reducing the risk of infringement and protecting or even enhancing the
financial reward from innovation. The benefit to society from
encouraging innovation is determined by the social value of the patent
and by the degree to which innovation is sensitive to the reward. Just
as the Hand Formula from torts compares the burden of precaution to
the expected loss avoided (the probability of the loss multiplied by the
severity),4 3 a rough cost-benefit standard for determining patent
damages would compare, on the margin, the social burden of
increasing damages (static cost) with the social benefit (elasticity of
innovation multiplied by its social value).
This suggests that as the social benefit from patent protection
increases, or as the social burden of protection falls, the damages
award should increase too. The most generous award will provide
maximal encouragement of innovation to the extent that it enhances
society's welfare. Such an award would induce investment in
innovation as long as the gain to society is at least as great. An award
that protects the lost profits and also provides an enhancement up to
the residual surplus to consumers generated by the patent would
satisfy this objective. This formula for optimal damages would be too
43. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d. Cir. 1947) (L.
Hand, J.) ("[T]he owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against
resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will
break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of
adequate precautions.").
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generous in cases where the innovation was of little value to society.
But for the most socially valuable innovations, this formula could
generate awards greater than the trebling required by Section 284. 4 4

IV.

THE LEGAL STANDARD

Returning to the legal question, what is the ideal standard for
enhanced damages? The foregoing economic analysis suggests that
the standard for enhanced damages should be consistent with the static
versus dynamic cost tradeoff that determines optimal damages. As the
social value of the patent increases, or if given a substantial social
value the sensitivity of innovation increases, the likelihood of
enhanced damages should increase too.
A.

EnhancementFactors

In general, the balancing of economic interests implied by this
analysis suggests a multi-factored "reasonableness" standard for
assessing damages.4 5 Many if not all of the factors taken into account
in the general torts setting for enhancing damages should be part of
the assessment of enhanced damages in the patent infringement
context. Enhanced (punitive) tort damages may be awarded after a
finding that the injurer's conduct was reprehensible, wanton,
malicious, or reckless. 4 6 In addition, courts have used several factors

to determine the degree to which damages should be enhanced. The
traditional factors for enhancement of tort damages were set out in
Green Oil v. Hornsby as follows:
(1) Punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to
the harm that is likely to occur from the defendant's

44.

Patent Act

of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2011); see also Keith N. Hylton and

Mengxi Zhang, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement, 52 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 44-57 (forthcoming 2017).
45. John M. Golden, Reasonable Certainty in Contractand PatentDamages,
30 HARv. J.L. & TECH., SPECIAL SYMPOsIuM, at 257-278 (2017).
46. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

2, at 9-10 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) ("Something more than the
mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be
circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or a fraudulent or
evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard
of the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton.").
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conduct as well as to the harm that actually has
occurred....
The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct
should be considered. The duration of this conduct, the
degree of the defendant's awareness of any hazard which
his conduct has caused or is likely to cause, and any
concealment... of that hazard, and the existence and
frequency of similar past conduct should all be relevant in
determining this degree of reprehensibility.
If the wrongful conduct was profitable to the defendant, the
punitive damages should remove the profit and should be
in excess of the profit, so that the defendant recognizes a
loss.
The financial position of the defendant would be relevant.
All the costs of litigation should be included, so as to
encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to trial.
If criminal sanctions have been imposed on the defendant
for his conduct, this should be taken into account in
mitigation of the punitive damages award.
If there have been other civil actions against the same
defendant, based on the same conduct, this should be taken
into account in mitigation of the punitive damages award.4 7

These factors cannot all be transported "as is" from the torts to
the patent infringement setting. Some of the Green Oil factors are not
relevant for patent infringement litigation-specifically factors (6)
and (7)-and should therefore not be incorporated into an assessment
of damages for patent infringement.
The threshold finding of reprehensibility in tort law has
generally relied on either a finding of maliciousness or recklessness.48
Malicious conduct is intentional and evinces a desire to injure the
victim. 49 Conduct is generally classified as intentional when the
47. 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989).
48. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003)
(finding that the court will consider whether the tortious conduct evinced a reckless
disregard of the health or safety of others and whether the harm is the result of
intentional malice when determining reprehensibility); Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 526 (1999) (noting that the "egregious conduct" requirement
for punitive awards may be met by a defendant's evil motive or intent).
49.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 130 (1887) ("It has been

shown, in dealing with the criminal law, that, when we call an act malicious in
common speech, we mean that harm to another person was intended to come of it,
and that such harm was desired for its own sake as an end in itself."); BMW of North
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injurer has acted while knowing with substantial certainty that he
would inflict a harm on the victim."0 Reckless conduct is not
necessarily intentional in this sense, but it indicates indifference to the
interests of the potential victim or victims. In general, an injurer acts
recklessly if he knows of the high probability of harm created by his
conduct and if the burden of avoiding the harm is slight.5 '
The Green Oil factors for determining the degree of
enhancement can also be applied to patent infringement. First, the
probability assessment at the heart of the recently overturned Seagate
willfulness standard should remain an important enhancement factor
under any reasonableness inquiry. The initial distinction in a
probability analysis should be that between intentional copying of an
existing technology and independent discovery. There is actually a
spectrum between these two endpoints, but for simplicity I will discuss
only the endpoints. The independent discoverer who develops an
infringing technology is guilty of infringement, but has not acted with
the intent of a deliberate trespasser. The case for imposing a penalty
that strips any gains from such an infringer would therefore be weak. 2
It may be socially desirable to enhance damages even in this case, for
deterrence purposes, but in general these are not strong cases for
enhancement.
The intentional copier of an existing technology presents a
more complicated scenario because there are special cases within this
category. An infringer can become an intentional copier in many
ways: he can attempt in good faith to design around an existing patent,
resulting in a substitute technology that he reasonably believes is noninfringing; he can attempt in good faith to design around an existing
patent, resulting in a substitute technology that he believes in good
faith, though not reasonably, is non-infiinging; he can copy an existing
technology while reasonably believing that it is not protected by a
valid patent or that his copy is not infringing; he can copy an existing
technology while believing in good faith, though not reasonably, that
it is not protected by a valid patent or that his copy is not infringing;
he can copy an existing technology while knowing full well that it is
protected by a valid patent and that his copy is infringing. The strength
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 589 (1996) (finding that "malice includes any
wrongful act without just cause or excuse... with an intent to injure the... property

of another").
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
§ 1 (Am. Law Inst. 2010); KEETON, supra note 46, § 8, at 34.
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL

50.
HARM

HARM

52.

§ 2(b) (Am. Law Inst. 2010).
Hylton, Punitive Damages, supra note 17, at 455-58.
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of the case for enhancement varies among these categories, generally
becoming stronger as one moves from the first to the last category.
This is so for two reasons. First, the intention to copy with knowledge
of the resulting legal violation increases as one moves from the first to
the last category, which suggests that the effectiveness of a damages
award in controlling incentives to infringe should increase as well.
Second, as one moves closer to the last category, the effectiveness of
a damages award that eliminates the prospect of gain from an
intentional violation should increase.
Consistent with the economic analysis in this paper and with
the Green Oil template, the severity of the harm to society should be
considered in the enhanced damages determination. In the patent
context, the severity of the harm to society will be related to the
patent's value to society as well as its monetary value to the patentee.
Under this consideration, the infringement of a legally strong patent
that promises enormous benefits to society-such as a cure for a
debilitating disease or condition-should be a factor supporting
enhanced damages. On the other hand, a patent with a relatively low
social value-for example, one of questionable validity because of
obviousness or abstraction-would be a poor candidate for damages
enhancement.
Taking the severity of the social harm into account is an
important step in any reasonableness analysis of damages. The Hand
Formula from negligence doctrine, for example, weighs the burden of
taking care against the product of the probability of harm and the
severity of harm.5 3 For a given probability of harm, the case for finding
negligence increases as the severity of harm increases. The same
should hold in the patent context. For any fixed likelihood of
infringement, enhancement should be more likely as the severity of
the social harm from infringement increases.
The same considerations of probability and severity apply in
the intentional (and reckless) torts context as well, which may have
clearer application to the infringement setting. There are many
examples of reckless conduct where the probability of harm is low.
Consider, for example, dropping large bricks from a freeway overpass.
If the traffic is not dense, the likelihood of hitting a car should be low.
However, the severity of the harm is quite high, and therefore almost
any court would consider such conduct reckless and appropriate for
enhanced damages. Similarly, in the patent infringement context, the
likelihood of infringement may be less than ftilly obvious, but if the
53.

United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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infringer deliberately copies while knowing that the social harm could
be great, enhancement of damages should be considered.
A third factor suggested by Green Oil, the difficulty in
identifying the infringer and especially any steps the infringer has
taken to avoid identification or conceal the infringing conduct, should
be considered in the enhancement of damages. Efforts to conceal
infringement should be considered as evidence that the infringer acted
with an intent to infringe. If such efforts reduce the likelihood that a
patentee will discover the identity of the infringer, they should be
included in the factors that support an enhancement of infringement
damages.
Past activity as an infiinger should count in favor of enhanced
damages. Evidence of past infringement reveals the nature of the
infringer's thinking and the perceived benefits he receives from
infringement. If in the presence of a known risk of being held liable,
and with experience of being found liable in the past, the infringer
continues to engage in infringement, then his conduct clearly indicates
that normal compensatory damages are insufficient to deter his
infringing conduct. Since the private benefits from infringement are
hidden from the public and known only to the infringer, evidence of
past conduct effectively reveals some of the infringer's private
information with respect to his own perceived benefits.
Similarly an infringer who continues to infringe after being
notified has revealed his own assessment that the risk of being held
liable is an insufficient deterrent. Damages should therefore be
enhanced to restore the deterrence capability.
Fourth, the profitability of the conduct to the infringer should
be a factor in enhancement. Take the case of a large firm that infringes
the patent of a smaller firm. If the large firm is a more efficient
producer because it can take advantage of economies of scale, it
should be able to compensate the small firm completely and still profit
from infringement. In the absence of an injunction against the
infringing activity, damages will have to serve as a substitute
deterrent. Damages should therefore be enhanced to provide the
appropriate level of deterrence.
The fourth Green Oil factor, litigation costs, is already
incorporated into the patent statute, as noted in Octane. However,
recovery for attorney's fees may not compensate for all of the costs of
litigation. Litigation imposes both direct and indirect costs. The
indirect costs come in the form of opportunity costs borne by
management that must take time away from work to pursue infringers
and to litigate against them. To the extent that indirect costs can be
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reduced to the minimum amount that could not be avoided by the
plaintiff, they should be considered directly attributable to the
infringer. These indirect costs should be taken into account in the
enhancement analysis.
Admittedly, patent litigation can be time consuming and
distracting for innovators.5 4 The Wright brothers are said to have spent
much of their careers consumed in patent litigation.55 An excessive or
obsessive approach to litigation should not be permitted to give rise to
a claim for enhanced damages. However, these concerns are
insufficient to justify a refusal to incorporate reasonable indirect costs
into the enhancement analysis.
The reasonableness approach suggested here is not very
different from the totality of circumstances approach to determining
willfulness that had been adopted by the Federal Circuit before the
Seagate standard. Under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, the
following factors were used to determine willfulness:
(1) whether the infringer had actual knowledge of an existing
patent;
(2) whether there is a good-faith belief on the part of the
infringer that the patent is invalid or not infringed;
(3) whether an infringer received a competent opinion;
(4) whether the infringer made a good-faith effort to design
around the patent;
(5) whether the infringer's behavior and tactics at trial are
consistent with a finding of good faith;
(6) whether there was deliberate copying;
(7) the infringer's motivation;

54. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent
InfringementLawsuits: Antitrust Rules andEconomic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REv.
747, 757-59 (2002) (discussing two categories of patent litigation costs: costs
directly attributable to the litigation and indirect costs; "patent litigation is a very
costly process" (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 334 (1971))).
55. See, e.g., Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 204 F. 597 (W.D.N.Y. 1913),
aff'd, 211 F. 654 (2d Cir. 1914) (the Wright brothers brought an infringement suit
against the Herring-Curtiss Company and Glenn Curtiss on their patent for
improvements for an aeroplane); Wright Co. v. Pauthan, 177 F. 261 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.)
(L. Hand, J.), rev'd, 180 F. 112 (2d Cir. 1910) ) (the Wright brothers brought a suit
against Louis Paulhan for infringing their patent for a flying machine); Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 888 (1990) (noting that the Wright brothers "engaged in
extensive litigation against companies that did not recognize their patent").
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(8) the size and finances of the infringer;
(9) the closeness of the case;
(10) the duration of the misconduct;
(11) whether the infringer took remedial steps;
(12) whether the infringer made any attempts to conceal the
infringement; and
(13) the defendant's motivation for harm. 56
All of these factors are consistent with a flexible, multifactored approach to enhancement. I have extended the pre-Seagate
test by including direct consideration of the severity of the social harm
from infringement. However, to some degree this consideration is
captured by an analysis of the closeness of the case. The factors that
indicate that a patent is likely to be found valid in court generally
reflect a rational tradeoff of the dynamic and static costs of patent
protection. Given the administrative difficulty of attempting to
measure the severity of the social harm, inclusion of consideration of
the closeness of the case (the strength of the patent and the likelihood
the activity infringed) may be the best approximation possible of a
social severity analysis.
B.

Elaborationon Intentionalityand Social Harm

The law traditionally has distinguished general (intent to act)
and specific (intent to harm) intent. 57 This distinction mirrors that
between good faith (acting with no intent to harm) and bad faith
(acting with intent to harm).58 The law also distinguishes conduct on
56. Jon E. Wright, Comment, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced
Damages-EvolutionandAnalysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 97, 107-08 (2001); see
also Read Corp., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Add Parenthetical).
57. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir.
1945) (L. Hand, J.) (characterizing specific intent as "an intent which goes beyond
the mere intent to do the act."); Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent,
74 S. CAL. L. REv. 657, 663 ("[W]e see only three [legal standards] in... the
common law generally: strict or per se liability coupled with general intent,
reasonableness coupled with general intent, and reasonableness coupled with
specific intent."); William Roth, General vs. Specific Intent: A Time for
Terminological Understanding in California, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 67, 72 (1979)
(distinguishing "specific intent," which describes purposeful conduct requiring a
greater degree of mental culpability, from "general intent," which denotes conduct
requiring a degree of fault less than purpose, such as recklessness or negligence).
58. E.g., Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 ARIZ. 149,162 (1986) (acting intentionally
with knowledge that the conduct was likely to cause unjustified, significant damage
is sufficient to show bad faith); Bumsed Oil Co. v. Grynberg, 320 F. App'x 222, 230
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reasonableness grounds. Thus, on intentionality alone, the most
innocent actor is one who has acted in good faith and reasonably. The
next step in the movement away from innocence is the actor who has
acted in good faith but unreasonably. The final category is bad faith.
The case for enhancement of damages increases according to this
order.
Compared to the common law concept of reasonableness, it
may seem initially to be unfair to permit a plaintiff to obtain a damages
award of any amount against an infringer who has acted in good faith
and on the basis of a reasonable belief of legality. However, the
difference between patent infringement and negligence is that a
finding of patent infringement incorporates a finding of social harm
that is divorced from the infringer's ability to perceive the specific
social harm generated by his conduct, whereas a finding of negligence
assumes that the tortfeasor did foresee the specific social harm from
his conduct. Still, the approach of patent law is not entirely foreign to
tort law; trespass routinely holds defendants liable even though they
have acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief of legality. 9
Another consideration regarding the question of intentionality
is the distinction between the meaning of willfulness in the torts and
patent infringement settings. As noted earlier, Seagate adopted a
willfulness requirement as a precondition to enhancement on the
theory that this is also the general approach of tort law.60 While it is
true that a finding of willfulness or recklessness is a precondition to
an award of punitive damages in tort law, recklessness in tort law is
(5th Cir. 2009) ("Bad faith is more than bad judgment or negligence: it is a neglect
or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an
honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive
and implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity.") (internal quotations omitted).
59. Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371, 372 (1835) (per curiam) ("It is the entry
that constitutes the trespass. There is no statute, nor rule of reason, that will make a
wilful entry into the land of another, upon an unfounded claim of right, innocent,
which one, who sat up no title to the land, could not justify or excuse.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 164 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1965) ("If the actor
is and intends to be upon a particular piece of land in question, it is immaterial that
he honestly and reasonably believes that he has the consent of the lawful possessor
to enter, or, indeed, that he himself is its possessor."); ); KEETON, supra note 46, §
13, at 74 ("The defendant is liable for an intentional entry although he has acted in
good faith, under the mistaken belief, however reasonable, that he is committing no
wrong.").
60. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(noting that willfulness is not unique to patent law and has an established meaning
in civil context).
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determined by a balancing test that incorporates both the probability
of harm and the severity. 61 Thus, an accurate importation of the
concept of willfulness from tort law into patent law would include a
multiplicity of factors, as suggested here, even at the threshold stage
of determining willfulness.

V.

THE DAMAGES MULTIPLIER

The second important normative question is what the proper
damages multiplier should be. There is no reason offered in the
economic analysis of damages to believe that the multiplier of three
observed in current law is necessarily optimal.
Economic analysis suggests that the optimal damages amount
should vary by case. 62 However, it would probably be too
administratively burdensome to calculate an optimal damages
multiplier based on measures of consumer welfare for every case. A
schedule or range of multipliers would be less burdensome to
implement. Still, even with a range, there is no reason suggested in the
economics literature to believe that the range should consist only of
numbers between one and three.
The question of feasibility might seem to be troubling in the
absence of evidence that any other scheme other than trebling had ever
been adopted. However, other schemes have been adopted. The first
patent statute, the Patent Act of 1790, provided unfettered discretion
to the court, providing no more guidance than "damages as shall be
assessed by a jury." 63 The patent statute was amended in 1793 to

provide for a mandatory minimum of treble damages. 64 In other words,
the 1793 patent statute permitted courts to apply a multiplier greater
than three but prohibited the application of a multiplier less than three.
These examples suggest that the deterrence concern was given greater
weight in the early period of American intellectual property law than
today.
The Clayton Act provides another example of a mandatory
multiplier. Under the Clayton Act, a federal court must apply a

61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 2(b) (Am. Law Inst. 2010).
62. See, e.g., Hylton, Punitive Damages, supra note 17.
63. Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch.7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
64. Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (allow the patentee
to recover "a sum, that shall be at least equal to three times the price, for which the
patentee has usually sold or licensed to other persons, the use of [the invention]").
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65
multiplier of three to compensatory damages for an antitrust injury.
Courts do not have the discretion to apply a lesser or greater multiplier.
These examples suggest that it is certainly administratively
feasible to adopt a multiplier scheme that differs from the current rule
of discretionary enhancement up to a multiple of three. The analysis
of economics here suggests that discretion over the multiplier should
be given to courts, and that a multiplier greater than three could be
appropriate in some cases. In cases where there is no evidence of
reprehensible conduct, concealment, or unusually high social value
attached to the patent, courts should have the discretion to award only
compensatory damages. On the other hand, in cases in which the
deterrence concern is especially great, courts should have the
discretion to exceed the trebling provision.
How high should courts permit the damages multiplier to go?
The first principle that ought to guide courts is that whenever the
infringer would continue to enjoy a profit from willful infringement
even after paying treble damages, the court should have discretion to
enhance damages to a level that would eliminate the willful infringer's
expected gain from infringement. By "willful" infringement, I refer to
cases of deliberate and knowing infringement of the sort that would
satisfy the Seagate standard for enhanced damages.
A second principle that should guide courts is that for cases of
concealment or where the identity of the infringer is difficult to
determine, courts should have discretion to apply a multiplier greater
than three to correct for the deterrence dilution that would otherwise
result. This discretion should exist even in cases where the facts do not
indicate deliberate and knowing infringement. The reason for this rule
is to deter infringement by actors who are able to conceal their
infringement, or in settings where infringers know that detection is
unlikely.
A third principle is that where the ratio of the social value to
the private value of the patent is considerably greater than three, courts
should have the discretion to go above a multiplier of three.
Establishing that the social value of the patent is much greater than the
private value is not necessarily difficult. The private value is
determined by the profit derived from the patent. The social value (ex
post) is determined by the residual consumer surplus that purchasers
of a patented product receive. If, for example, the consumer surplus is
an order of magnitude greater than the profit to the patentee, a court
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should have discretion to enhance damages to reflect the
correspondingly greater importance of deterrence.
Although it may be too administratively burdensome for a
court to implement the third principle in full, rough shortcuts can be
developed for some cases. Consider, for example, the hepatitis C drug
Sovaldi, which requires a treatment regime costing $84,000.66 The
alternative is a liver transplant that costs roughly $300,000.67 A
simple, back-of-the-envelope estimate of the total consumer surplus
generated by Sovaldi would multiply the number of patients receiving
the drug by the difference between costs of the two treatment regimes,
$216,000. Assuming a 44% profit margin on Sovaldi, 68 we can make
a rough estimate of 6 for the ratio of consumer surplus to the profit
from Sovaldi. Thus, the third principle suggests an optimal multiplier
of 6, rather than the trebling provided by statute, if the patent for
Sovaldi were to be infringed. This example suggests that it is not too
difficult to adopt a variable damages multiplier based on the social
value of the infringed patent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The justification for enhancing damages for patent
infringement is quite similar to that for enhancing damages for any
tort. The literature applying economics to tort law, as well as tort
doctrine itself, has generated a number of theories as well as specific
factors that patent courts could consider in the damages enhancement
analysis. These theories and legal tests can be used to provide
guidance to courts in developing a modernized common law of
damages for patent infringement. Halo grants courts significant
discretion in determining whether damages for patent infringement
should be enhanced, but that discretion need not be unstructured by
economic principles.

66. John LaMattina, What PriceInnovation? The Sovaldi Saga, FORBES (May
29, 2014, 8:25 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/j ohnlamattina/2014/05/29/whatprice-innovation-the-sovaldi-saga/#79e597701 cel.
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margin was 44% for the first quarter of 2014).

